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Tools of the Trade
The principled control of false positives in
neuroimaging
Craig M. Bennett,1 George L. Wolford,2 and Michael B. Miller1
1Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, California, 93106 and 2Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences,
Moore Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, USA
An incredible amount of data is generated in the course of a functional neuroimaging experiment. The quantity of data gives us
improved temporal and spatial resolution with which to evaluate our results. It also creates a staggering multiple testing problem.
A number of methods have been created that address the multiple testing problem in neuroimaging in a principled fashion. These
methods place limits on either the familywise error rate (FWER) or the false discovery rate (FDR) of the results. These principled
approaches are well established in the literature and are known to properly limit the amount of false positives across the whole
brain. However, a minority of papers are still published every month using methods that are improperly corrected for the number
of tests conducted. These latter methods place limits on the voxelwise probability of a false positive and yield no information on
the global rate of false positives in the results. In this commentary, we argue in favor of a principled approach to the multiple
testing problemone that places appropriate limits on the rate of false positives across the whole brain gives readers the
information they need to properly evaluate the results.
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The struggle between the appropriate treatment of false pos-
itives and false negatives is a fine line that every scientist
must walk. If our criteria are too conservative, we will not
have the power to detect meaningful results. If our thresh-
olds are too liberal, our results will become contaminated by
an excess of false positives. Ideally, we hope to maximize the
number of true positives (hits) while minimizing false
reports.
It is a statistical necessity that we must adapt our thresh-
old criteria to the number of statistical tests completed on
the same dataset. This multiple testing problem is not unique
to neuroimaging; it affects many areas of modern science.
Ask an economist about finding market correlations between
10 000 stocks or a geneticist about testing across 100 000
SNPs and you will quickly understand the pervasiveness of
the multiple testing problem throughout scientific research
(Storey and Tibshirani, 2003; Taleb, 2004).
In this article, we argue for the use of principled correc-
tions when dealing with the large number of comparisons
typical of neuroimaging data. By principled, we mean a cor-
rection that definitively identifies for the reader the
probability or the proportion of false positives that could
be expected in the reported results. Ideally, the correction
would be easy for the reader to understand. Many research-
ers have avoided principled correction due to the perception
that such methods are too conservative. In theory and in
practice, there is no reason for a principled correction to
be either liberal or conservative. The degree of ‘conservative-
ness’ generally can be adjusted by setting a parameter and
maintaining accurate knowledge about the prevalence of
false positives. Later in the commentary, we will outline
familywise error rate (FWER) correction and false discovery
rate (FDR) correction as two examples of principled
approaches.
THE PROBLEM
Many published functional magnetic resonance imaging
(FMRI) papers use arbitrary, uncorrected statistical thresh-
olds. A commonly chosen threshold is P< 0.001 with a min-
imum voxel clustering value of 10 voxels. For a few datasets,
this threshold may strike an appropriate balance between
sensitivity and specificity; and in a few cases it might be
possible to specify the probability of a false positive with
this threshold. However, this uncorrected cutoff cannot be
valid for the diverse array of situations in which it is used.
The same threshold has been used with data comprising
10 000 voxels and with data comprising 60 000 voxelsthis
simply cannot be appropriate. The two situations have very
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different probabilities of false positives. The use of a princi-
pled procedure would yield the same expected probability or
proportion of false positives for any number of voxels under
investigation.
In a recent survey of all articles published in six major
neuroimaging journals during the year 2008, we found that
between 25% and 30% of fMRI articles in each journal used
uncorrected thresholds in their analysis (Bennett et al.,
Under Review). This percentage speaks to the fact that the
majority of published research uses principled correction.
However, the meta-analysis also highlights that a quarter
to a third of published papers do not use principled correc-
tion, and that such papers continue to be published in
high-impact, specialized journals. The proportion of studies
using uncorrected thresholds is even higher within the realm
of conference posters and presentations. In a survey of pos-
ters presented at a recent neuroscience conference, we found
that 80% of the presentations used uncorrected thresholds.
In these unprincipled cases, the reader is unlikely to have an
accurate idea about the true likelihood of false positives in
the results.
The prevalence of unprincipled correction in the literature
is a serious issue. During an examination of familywise
error-correction methods in neuroimaging, Nichols and
Hayasaka (2003) compared techniques that included
Gaussian Random Field Theory, Bonferroni, FDR, Sˇida´k
and permutation. They found that only 8 out of 11 fMRI
and PET studies had any significant voxels after familywise
correction had been completed, leaving 3 studies with no
significant voxels at all. Based on these data, it is quite
likely that results comprised wholly of false positives are
present in the current literature. Despite this fact, new stud-
ies reporting uncorrected statistics are published every
month.
False positives can be costly in a number of ways. One
example of the negative consequences of false positives can
be illustrated in a study completed by one of the current
authors (MBM) in graduate school. He conducted an
fMRI study investigating differential activations between
false memories and true memories using the Roediger and
McDermott word paradigm (1995). At the same time,
Schacter and colleagues were conducting a PET study
using the same approach. Using a liberal uncorrected thresh-
old, Schacter and colleagues (1996) found a few small
regions of interest in the medial temporal lobe and superior
temporal sulcus. In their own results, Miller and colleagues
found two very different small clusters in the frontal and
parietal cortex. When the Miller et al. (1996) study was pres-
ented at the Society for Neuroscience conference it was
made clear that multiple testing correction was necessary.
None of the results survived correction and the study was
never released, while the uncorrected Schacter results were
published in a major neuroimaging journal. Since that time
there has been a scattering of studies reporting different pat-
terns of brain activations for false memories and for true
memories. Virtually all of them have used uncorrected
thresholds and have proven difficult to replicate.
This situation raises two issues. The first issue is the
amount of time and resources that have been spent trying
to extend results that may never have existed in the first
place. The second issue is the prevailing skewed view of
the literature that brain activations can be reliably discerned
between false and true memories because only reports with
positive results will be published.
Less rigorous control of Type I errors would not be so bad
if inferences based on false positives were easily correctable.
However, this does not seem to be the case within the cur-
rent model of publication. If researchers fail to reproduce
the results of a currently published study, it would be quite
difficult to disseminate their null findings. This forms one of
the most profound differences between Types I and II errors:
false negatives are correctable in future publications, whereas
false positives are difficult to refute once established in the
literature.
This imbalance in the propagation of Types I and II errors
contributes to an issue known as the ‘File Drawer Problem’
(Rosenthal, 1979). This refers to the publication bias that
ensues because the probability of a study being published
is directly tied to the significance of a result. While presen-
tation of null results is not unheard of (see Baker,
Hutchinson, 2007), such publications are generally consid-
ered the exception and not the rule.
Another important cautionary tale is our recent investiga-
tion of false positives during the acquisition of fMRI data
from a dead Atlantic salmon (Bennett et al., 2009; Under
Review). Using standard acquisition, preprocessing and
analysis techniques, we were able to show that active voxel
clusters could be observed in the dead salmon’s brain when
using uncorrected statistical thresholds. If any form of cor-
rection for multiple testing was applied, these false positives
were no longer present. While the dead salmon study can
only speak to the role of principled correction in a single
subject, we believe it effectively illustrates the dangers of false
positives in any neuroimaging analysis.
A bit of clarification may be important at this point. Our
goal should not be to completely eliminate false positives. To
be completely certain that all of our results are true positives
would require obscenely high statistical thresholds that
would eliminate all but the very strongest of our legitimate
results. Therefore we must accept that there will always be
some risk of false positives in our reports. At the same time,
it is critical that we be able to specify how probable false
positives are in our data in a way that is readily communi-
cated to the reader.
In this discussion of false positives, it is also important
that we not minimize the danger of high false negative rates.
Being over-conservative regarding the control of Type I error
comes at the expense of missing true positives. Perhaps for
this reason, there have been some voices in the imaging
community that argue against principled correction due to
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the resulting loss of statistical power. Again, a principled
correction does not necessarily lead to a loss of power.
The researcher can set a liberal criterion in FDR or FWE
and the readers can use their precise knowledge of the false
positive rate to evaluate the reported results.
OUR ARGUMENT
There is a single key argument that we wish to make regard-
ing proper protection against Type I error in fMRI. All
researchers should use statistical methods that provide infor-
mation on the Type I error rate across the whole brain. It
does not matter what method you use to accomplish this.
You can report the FDR (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) or
use one of several methods to control for the FWER (Nichols
and Hayasaka, 2003). You can even do a back-of-the-napkin
calculation and use a Bonferroni-corrected threshold if you
wish. The end goal is the same: giving the reader information
on the prevalence of false positives across the entire family of
statistical tests.
We would further argue that an investigator could still use
an uncorrected threshold for their data as long as proper
corrected values detailing the prevalence of false positives
are also provided. In this manner, you could threshold
your data at P< 0.001 with a 10 voxel extent as long as
you presented what FDR or FWE threshold would be
required for the results to stay significant. One example
can be seen in figure 1. In this image, voxels that survive
an uncorrected threshold are depicted in cool colors while
voxels that survive FDR correction are depicted in warm
colors. This allows a researcher to ‘have their cake and eat
it too’. Again, the key to our argument is not that we need to
use correction simply for correction’s sake, just that our
readers are made aware of the false positive rate across the
whole brain.
Techniques for principled correction
There are a wide variety of methods that can be used to hold
the false positive rate at specified levels across the whole
brain. One approach is to place limits on the FWER.
Using this method, a criterion value of 0.05 would mean
that there is a 5% chance of one or more false positives
across the entire set of tests. This yields a 95% confidence
level that there are no false positives in your results.
There are many methods that can be used to control the
FWER in neuroimaging data: the Bonferroni correction,
the use of Gaussian Random Field Theory (Worsley et al.,
1992), and non-parametric permutation correction tech-
niques (Nichols and Holmes, 2002). Nichols and Hayasaka
(2003) have authored an excellent article reviewing these
techniques. The Bonferroni correction is typically seen as
too conservative for functional neuroimaging since it does
not take into account spatial correlation between voxels.
Gaussian RFT adapts to spatial smoothness of the data,
but was shown to be quite conservative at low levels of
smoothness. The use of permutation-based techniques to
control the FWER emerged as an ideal choice for adequate
correction while maintaining high sensitivity.
Another approach to principled correction is to place
limits on the FDR (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995;
Genovese et al., 2002). Using this method, a criterion value
of 0.05 would mean that on average 5% of the observed
results would be false positives. The goal of this approach
is not to completely eliminate familywise errors, but to con-
trol how pervasive false positives are in the results. This is a
weaker control to the multiple testing problem, but one that
still provides precise estimates of the percentage of false
positives.
The advantages and disadvantages of each correction
approach are illustrated graphically using simulated data in
Figure 2. The simulated data are set up so that the uncor-
rected results have a power of 0.80. Controlling for the
FWER with the criterion P(FWE)¼ 0.05 can be seen to vir-
tually eliminate false positives while dramatically reducing
the amount of detected signal. In this example, power is
reduced to 0.16. Controlling the FDR with the criterion
FDR¼ 0.05 increases the number of false positives relative
to FWER techniques, but also increases the ability to detect
meaningful signal. In this example, power is increased
to 0.54.
If you are concerned about power, you can appropriately
adjust the cutoff in FWE or FDR. For instance, it is not
strictly necessary to use 0.05 in either FWE or FDR. It
might yield a better balance of power and false positive
Fig. 1 Example figure of a hybrid corrected/uncorrected data presentation. Areas that are significant under an uncorrected threshold of P< 0.001 with a 10-voxel extent criteria
are shaded in blue. Areas that are significant under a corrected threshold of FDR¼ 0.05 are shaded in orange.
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protection to use 0.10 or even something higher. You will be
more likely to find true sources of activation and the reader
will still have a precise idea about the prevalence of false
positives.
It is important to understand the appropriate use of the
correction method you select. For instance, one commonly
used approach is the small-volume correction (SVC) method
in SPM (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The use of SVC
allows researchers to conduct principled correction using
Gaussian Random Field Theory within a predefined region
of interest. Ideally, this would be a region defined by ana-
tomical boundaries or a region identified in a previous, inde-
pendent dataset. However, many researchers implement SVC
incorrectly, choosing to first conduct a whole-brain explor-
atory analysis and then using SVC on the resulting clusters
(cf Loring et al., 2002; Poldrack and Mumford, 2009). This is
an inappropriate approach that does not yield a principled
correction. Another method that is often incorrectly used is
the AlphaSim tool included in AFNI (http://afni.nimh.nih
.gov/afni/). For effective false positive control, AlphaSim
requires an estimate of the spatial correlation across voxels
be modeled using the program 3dFWHM. Many researchers
simply input the amount of Gaussian smoothing that was
applied during preprocessing, leading to incorrect clustering
thresholds as output. Errors during estimation of the spatial
smoothness can also lead to incorrect values.
In the future, we may have statistical methods that are
better able to address the multiple testing problem.
Hierarchical Bayes models have been offered as one
approach (Lindquist and Gelman, 2009). We may even
Fig. 2 Demonstration of correction methods for the multiple testing problem. (a) A raw image of the simulated data used in this example. A field of Gaussian random noise was
added to a 100 100 image with a 50 50 square section of signal in the center. (b) Thresholded image of the simulated data using a pixelwise statistical test. The threshold
for this test was P< 0.05. Power is high at 0.80, but a number of false positives can be observed. (c) Thresholded image of the simulated data using a Bonferroni FWER
correction. The probability of a familywise error was set to 0.05. There are no false positives across the entire set of tests, but power is reduced to 0.16. (d) Thresholded image of
the simulated data while controlling the false discovery rate. The FDR for this example was set to 0.05. Out of the results, 4.9% are known to be false positives but power is
increased to 0.54.
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move away from the binary decision of significance and
begin to examine effect sizes in earnest (Wager, 2009).
Still, we must examine the balance of Types I and II errors
in the context of where our analysis techniques are today. At
present, the general linear model is by far the most prevalent
method of analysis in fMRI. Mumford and Nichols (2009)
found that 92% of group fMRI results were computed
using an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the gen-
eral linear model. This percentage is unlikely to shift dra-
matically in the next 12–36 months. Our focus should
remain on how to improve OLS methods in the near term
as we move toward new analysis techniques in the future.
Predetermined cluster size as a partial correction
In neuroimaging, we often rely on the fact that legitimate
results tend to spatially cluster together. The assumption
being that voxel clustering provides some assurance against
Type I errors. While predefined thresholds in combination
with predetermined clustering requirements may represent a
sufficient approximation of a proper threshold, it is in gen-
eral an unprincipled approach to the control of Type I error
rates.
Many authors justify this approach by referring to the
results of Forman et al. (1995), who examined clustering
behavior of voxels in fMRI. The results of Forman et al.
suggest that a threshold of P< 0.001 combined with a
10-voxel extent requirement should more than adequately
control for the prevalence of false positives. However, the
Forman et al. data were only computed across two-
dimensional slices, not in 3D volumes. The findings of
Forman et al. simply do not apply to modern fMRI data.
It should also be noted that we are not arguing that
P< 0.001 with a 10-voxel threshold is wholly inappropriate.
For example, Cooper and Knutson (2008) used the
AlphaSim utility in AFNI to determine that a corrected
threshold of P< 0.001 with a 10-voxel extent threshold
would be appropriate to keep the FWER at 5% in their par-
ticular dataset. The problem is that this threshold is specific
to the parameters of their dataset, and may be inappropriate
in other datasets. Arnott et al. (2008) used the same AFNI
routine and estimated that an 81-voxel extent was required
to ensure that familywise error was kept below 5%. It is
possible to use the combination of a P-value and a cluster
size in a principled way, but it requires computing the
proper values for each and every analysis. The cluster size
criteria can change quite substantially from dataset to data-
set. Further, it can be the case that required cluster sizes
become so large that legitimate results with a smaller
volume are missed.
CONCLUSIONS
The topic of proper Type I error protection is not a new
element of discussion in the field of neuroimaging. The need
to correct for thousands of statistical tests has been recog-
nized since the early PET imaging days (Worsley et al.,
1992). It is uncertain why uncorrected thresholds have lin-
gered so long. Perhaps many researchers simply recognized it
as an accepted, arbitrary threshold in the same manner
P< 0.05 is an accepted, arbitrary threshold throughout
other scientific fields. This approach may have been accept-
able in the past, but within the last decade we, as a field, have
come under increased scrutiny from the public and from
other scientists. At a time when so many are looking for
us to slip up, we believe it is time to set a new standard of
quality with regard to our data acquisition and analysis.
The fundamental question that that all researchers must
face is whether their results will replicate in a new study. The
prevalence of false positives in your results will directly influ-
ence this ability. We are all aware that the multiple testing
problem is a major issue in neuroimaging. How you correct
for this problem can be debated, but principled protection
against Type I error is an absolute necessity for moving
forward.
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